PDC Consulting, Inc.  v. Jared Porter : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
PDC Consulting, Inc. v. Jared Porter : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Matthew Raty; Attorney for Appellee.
Ronald Ady; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, PDC Consulting v. Porter, No. 20060920 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6873
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PDC CONSULTING, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JARED PORTER, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
PDC CONSULTING, INC. 
No. 20060920-CA 
Fourth District Court, American Fork 
Civil No. 050100017 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
JUDGE DEREK PULLAN 
Counsel for Appellee: Counsel for Appellant: 
Matthew Raty 
9677 S 700 E STE D 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Attorney for Appellee Jared Porter 
Ronald Ady 
8 E. Broadway, Ste. 710 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Attorney for PDC Consulting, Inc. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 1 2 200? 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PDC CONSULTING, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JARED PORTER, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
PDC CONSULTING, INC. 
No. 20060920-CA 
Fourth District Court, American Fork 
Civil No. 050100017 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
JUDGE DEREK PULLAN 
Counsel for Appellee: Counsel for Appellant: 
Matthew Raty 
9677 S 700 E STE D 
Sandy^ Utah 84070 
Attorney for Appellee Jared Porter 
Ronald Ady 
8 E. Broadway, Ste. 710 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Attorney for PDC Consulting, Inc. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PDctcONSULTING, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JARFjD PORTER, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
PDC CONSULTING, INC. 
No. 20060920-CA 
Fourth District Court, American Fork 
Civil No. 050100017 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
JUDGE DEREK PULLAN 
Counsel for Appellee: Counsel for Appellant: 
Matthew Raty 
9677 S 700 E STE D 
Sandy[ Utah 84070 
Attorrjey for Appellee Jared Porter 
Ronald Ady 
8 E. Broadway, Ste. 710 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Attorney for PDC Consulting, Inc. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PDC CONSULTING, INC, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JARED PORTER, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
PDC CONSULTING, INC. 
No. 20060920-CA 
Fourth District Court, American Fork 
Civil No. 050100017 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
JUDGE DEREK PULLAN 
Counsel for Appellee: Counsel for Appellant: 
Matthew Raty 
9677 S 700 E STE D 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Attorney for Appellee Jared Porter 
Ronald Ady 
8 E. Broadway, Ste. 710 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Attorney for PDC Consulting, Inc. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 




Other Authorities 1 
II. JURISDICTION 1 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
Issue No. 1 - Was the trial court's April 4, 2006 Order the result of a mistake as to 
the Length of Time that had elapsed? 1 
Issue No. 2 - Did the Appellant's entry of a certificate of readiness render moot the 
issue of failure to prosecute? 1 
Issue No. 3 - Did The Court Abuse Its Discretion In Dismissing For Want Of 
Prosecution? 2 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of the Proceedings 3 
C. Disposition at the Trial Court 5 
V. RELEVANT FACTS 5 
A. Facts about the Case 5 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
VII. ARGUMENT 9 
ii 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF A CERTIFICATE 
OF READINESS WAS PROPERLY MADE 9 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LAW IN REVERSING ITS APRIL 4, 2006 
RULING AT THE RECONVENED AUGUST 10, 2006 OSC HEARING 11 
1. All necessary pleadings had been filed 12 
2. Counsel had completed all discovery 12 
3. Settlement discussions have been pursued by counsel, but no settlement 
has been effected 13 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PDC'S 
CLAIMS 16 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 27 
iii 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1082 (Utah 1985) 13 
Bonneville Tower Condominium Mgt. Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., Inc., 728 
P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986) 26 
Bradshaw v. Burningham, 671 P.2d 196,198 (Utah 1983) 13 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,1116, 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 
2002) 15 
Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2005 UT 21, 116 16 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) 26 
Hartford Leasing Corporation v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
2, 16, 21, 22, 25, 26 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987) 24 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1126 2 
Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986) 15 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847, 866 (1994) 1 
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44,1132 1, 15 
State v. Morgan, 527 P.2d 225 (Utah 1974) 24 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) 1 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 
(1975) 26 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2)0') 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
iv 
II. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court 
has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2)(j). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No, 1 - Was the trial court's April 4, 2006 Order the result of a mistake as to 
the Length of Time that had elapsed? 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's April 4, 2006 order was sufficiently 
founded in fact is judged by a clearly erroneous standard of review. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was preserved at R.732: page 9/ line 24 et seq. 
Issue No. 2 - Did the Appellant's entry of a certificate of readiness render moot the 
issue of failure to prosecute? 
Standard of Review: Whether there is a justiciable controversy before a trial court 
is governed by a correction of error standard. See Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44,1132. 
This issue was preserved at R.732: page 10/ line 22 et seq; page 12/ line 10 et seq; 
page 14/line 11 et seq. 
Further, issues involving the separation of powers between branches of 
government involve exceptional circumstances warranting judicial review on appeal. See 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 847, 866 (1994). Advisory opinions or non-
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justiciable controversies offend the the separation of powers doctrine and so create 
exceptional circumstances warranting appellate review. See Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 
12,1f26. 
Issue No. 3 - Did The Court Abuse Its Discretion In Dismissing For Want Of 
Prosecution? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court properly dismissed a case for want of 
prosecution of governed by an abuse of discretion standard. See Hartford Leasing 
Corporation v. State. 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
This issue was preserved at R.732: page 9/ line 24 et seq. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Defendant/Appellee Jared Porter was formerly employed by the 
Plaintiff/Appellant PDC as a graphic designer. Previous to his employment with PDC 
Porter was employed by PDC's largest client. At the time he was employed by PDC 1999 
it paid him double what he had been previously earning. That employment was governed 
by an employment agreement which included a non-compete provision and made all of 
Porter's design work produced for PDC a work for hire. In February of 2000 Porter 
became romantically involved with one of the account managers for PDCs largest client. 
Porter and that account manager arranged for him to surreptitiously perform graphic 
design work for that client. Throughout this time Porter was secretly burning CDs 
2 
containing PDC's proprietary graphic design work and graphic design tools. In January 
of 2001 Porter abruptly terminated his employment with PDC and took the CDs with him. 
PDC then reviewed the files on the computer Porter had used and discovered that he had 
been doing work on his own account for PDCs largest client. PDC sued Porter and 
obtained a pre-judgment writ of replevin. Porter's laptop computer was seized along with 
39 CDs with handwritten labels indicating they contained proprietary work performed for 
PDC's client. The parties entered into an April 15, 2001 agreement stipulating the terms 
upon which PDC's claims against Porter would be settled. Under its terms the Defendant 
was to account to Plaintiff for all money paid to him by Plaintiffs client and to make full 
disclosure of all of his dealings with third parties regarding the Defendant's work for that 
client. However, when deposed the Defendant refused to make that accounting and 
repeatedly testified he could not recall particulars of his dealings with the client. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
April 6, 2001 Appellant filed a complaint, a motion for a pre-judgment writ of 
replevin, six supporting affidavits, an ex-parte motion for a TRO, a 
memorandum in support of a motion for a TRO and a motion for 
expedited discovery, and a motion for leave to file an over-length 
memorandum. 
April 6, 2001 The trial court issued a TRO, order authorizing expedited discovery, 
an order granting leave to file an over-length memorandum, an order 
authorizing a pre-judgment writ of replevin. 
April 15, 2001 An agreement is signed specifying the terms that must be complied 
with by the Defendant Porter for him to be released from Plaintiffs 
claims in this action. 
April 16, 2001 A hearing on the TRO is held, counsel appearing for both parties and 
that hearing is continued to May 11, 2001. 
3 
May 7, 2001 A stipulation is filed with the court specifying the terms for the 
copying of the hard drive on the Appellee's computer and for the re-
delivery of that computer to the Appellee. 
May 7, 2001 An order approving that stipulation issues that same day. 
May 11, 2001 The TRO hearing is continued to June 18, 2001 at counsel's request. 
June 18, 2001 Counsel for Porter fails to appear at the TRO hearing. Counsel for 
the Appellant addresses the court as to a possible settlement and 
requests and evidentiary hearing. 
August 14, 2001 The evidentiary hearing scheduled for this date proceeds after the 
advice to the court by counsel for the Appellee that the case has 
settled. Appellant's CEO is examined by counsel for the Appellee. 
April 9, 2003 Appellee moves to enforce the agreement on settlement terms. 
May 10, 2003 Appellant moves to set aside the settlement. 
November 26, 2003 The court denied the Appellee's motion to Enforce the Agreement on 
settlement terms and Motion for Costs. It also denied the Appellant's 
motion to set aside the agreement on settlement terms. 
October 27, 2004 The court issues an OSC re: dismissal returnable before the court 
November 30, 2004. 
November 30, 2004 Counsel for the parties appear and the court orders discovery to be 
completed within 90 days. 
March 1, 2005 A stipulation by the parties to extend the time for discovery is filed. 
April 4, 2006 The court orders that a Certificate of Readiness for Trial be filed 
with the court by April 30, 2006 or the case will be dismissed 
without further notice. 
April 28, 2006 Appellant fax-files a certificate of readiness to the trial court. 
May 8, 2006 Appellee/Defendant objects to the certificate of readiness arguing 
that it has not had sufficient opportunity to complete discovery. 
August 09, 2006 Appellant's motion to strike and amended motion to strike the 
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Appellee Porter's Objection is fax-filed with the trial court. 
August 10, 2006 Appellant/Plaintiffs motion to strike the Appellee/Defendant's 
Objection is filed. 
August 10, 2006 The court rules that the case should be dismissed with prejudice. 
August 31, 2006 Appellant objects to the proposed form of order dismissing the case 
with prejudice. 
September 5, 2006 Order dismissing the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. 
October 5, 2006 Notice of Appeal filed. 
C. Disposition at the Trial Court 
After a certificate of readiness for trial is entered, the Appellee Porter moved to 
dismiss the case with prejudice and that motion is granted. 
V. RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Facts about the Case 
In June of 2001 Jared Porter was deposed by PDC and a disagreement arose 
between the parties whether Porter was performing as promised under the terms of the 
April 15, 2001 agreement to settle the Plaintiffs claims against Porter. On April 9, 2003 
Porter moved to enforce the agreement on settlement terms. R. 0310. PDC responded by 
moving to set aside the agreement on settlement terms. R. 0373. This litigation 
culminated in an order of Judge Lynn Davis dated November 26, 2003 in which he 
refused to enforce the agreement on settlement terms. Instead, the parties were directed 
to pursue discovery. R. 0619. After Judge Davis's order, Judge Derek Pullan assumed 
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conduct of the case. 
Pursuant to an order of Judge Pullan dated November 30, 2004, discovery in this 
case was to have been conducted during 2005. Despite stipulations by the parties to 
extend the time for discovery, neither party commenced discovery. On March 14, 2006 
Judge Pullan issued an Order to Show Cause, returnable before the court in American 
Fork on April 4, 2006 at 9 a.m., requiring the parties to show cause why the case should 
not be dismissed. R.0637. At that hearing the court took into account the eighteen 
months delay in prosecuting the case (actually only sixteen months). R. 0733; page 5/ line 
7. The court then ordered that certificate of readiness or scheduling order be filed with 
the court by April 30, 2006. On April 28, 2006 a certificate of readiness was fax-filed by 
PDC's counsel. R. 0641. 
On May 8, 2006 Porter objected to the entry of the Certificate of Readiness and 
moved to dismiss the case, alleging that Porter had not yet filed an answer, that there had 
been no opportunity for discovery, that PDC had failed to challenge the settlement within 
the time limited, that the issue of settlement was yet to be litigated and that PDC's only 
remedies would sound in contract. R. 0682. In substance, Porter's motion alleged that the 
trial court had mistakenly believed that only a short time had elapsed since the last 
hearing before the court, when in fact there had been no steps taken in the case from 
November 30, 2004 to April 4, 2006, and that the court had on the basis of that mistaken 
belief directed the entry of the certificate of readiness. Porter's motion also claimed that 
the enforceability of the agreement on settlement terms was a predicate to any trial on the 
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merits and that because the November 3, 2003 order had denied the PDCs motion to set 
aside the settlement, the entry of the certificate of readiness was in error. In fact, the court 
decided in its November 26, 2003 order denied both parties motions for summary 
judgment on the issue of enforceability of the April 15, 2001 agreement on settlement 
terms, ruling that material issues of disputed fact remained. R. 0623. The trial court 
specifically relied upon Porter's factual misstatements in reversing its prior order and 
dismissing the case with prejudice. R.732: page 23/ line 19 et seq. However, no order 
striking the certificate of readiness has ever been entered. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law settlement agreements are executory and until the terms of a 
settlement agreement are fulfilled there is no settlement. PDC's settlement agreement 
with Porter specifically contemplated Porter being deposed under oath and fully 
disclosing all details regarding his involvement with third parties in his wrongful 
appropriation of PDC's business interests and proprietary information. Porter was 
deposed under oath and as a result of that deposition PDC maintained that it was apparent 
Porter was refusing to make the disclosure promised. Subsequently, Porter moved to 
enforce a settlement agreement and PDC responded by moving to set the settlement 
agreement aside. Judge Davis ruled that there were material disputed issues of fact that 
prevented summary judgment on the issue of whether the settlement agreement was 
enforceable and directed the parties to litigate that issue. 
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Judge Davis's order by its terms placed just as great an onus on Porter as PDC to 
litigate that issue. Although PDC had already conducted extensive discovery on that 
issue, subsequent to November 30, 2004 neither party took any steps to litigate that issue 
and when on April 4, 2006 an OSC hearing was held before Judge Pullan he specifically 
noted that eighteen months had elapsed since the November 30, 2004 order, thus 
establishing that there was no confusion in his mind about the length of time that elapsed 
without activity by either party. 
Judge Pullan ordered that a certificate of readiness or a scheduling order be filed 
by April 30, 2006, and PDC complied by filing a certificate of readiness on April 28, 
2006. That certificate of readiness was properly filed because PDC had performed all the 
discovery necessary to prosecute its case against Porter and Porter had for almost two and 
one half years done nothing to advance his case, because Judge Davis had previously 
ruled that whether the case had been settled could not be resolved without a trial and 
because since November 26, 2003 Porter had known he needed to file an answer but had 
failed to do so. Further, PDC's filing of the certificate of readiness rendered the issue of 
failure to prosecute moot, especially when Porter's failure to move for the entry of a 
scheduling order is considered. 
Instead, Porter waited to see whether PDC would file a certificate of readiness. 
When it did Porter objected. That objection sought re-litigate the issue of failure to 
prosecute by falsely alleging that PDC was solely responsible for the eleven month delay 
that had accrued. Porter also moved to collaterally attack Judge Davis's November 26, 
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2003 order by asking Judge Pullan, in effect, to rule that because the enforceability of the 
settlement agreement had not been further litigated, and because Porter had not taken the 
opportunity to conduct discovery on the enforceability of the settlement agreement, Judge 
Pullan should rule that PDC had failed to prosecute its claim that the settlement 
agreement was not enforceable and so its entire case against Porter must be dismissed. 
In addition to the lapse of time there are five factors that must be employed by a 
trial court in exercising its discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. These are: 
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the 
case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward; (4) the 
difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) most 
important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Plainly, when a certificate of 
readiness had already been filed, when there was no reasonable basis for re-litigating the 
trial court's April 4, 2006 order and when Porter had clearly been much more negligent 
than PDC in prosecuting the action, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
accept Porter's repeated misstatement of the facts controlling the procedural posture of 
the case and dismiss PDC's claims by relying on Porter' misstatements. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF A CERTIFICATE 
OF READINESS WAS PROPERLY MADE 
In making its order for the entry of a certificate of readiness (or entry of a 
scheduling order) the trial court was well aware that a lengthy period of time had elapsed 
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since its order of November 30, 2004. The court refers to this lapse of time as eighteen 
months (when actually it was sixteen months).1 The court then noted that the 90 day 
period provided for discovery had elapsed. And, contrary to Porter's representations to 
the court on August 10, 2006,2 the court specifically noted that the parties had stipulated 
to an extension of discovery to April 30, 2005 by stating "And then there's an extension, 
there's an agreement for an extension of time to April 30th in the file, 2005."3 The court 
then advised that a notice of readiness be filed "after that" on April 30, 2006. If, as 
counsel for Porter maintained, the court was under the misapprehension that the 
stipulation for discovery ran through April 30, 2006, the court would have selected a date 
after April 30, 2006 for the filing of a notice of readiness for trial. But it selected April 
30, 2006, which confirmed that it was aware that the stipulation had already expired. 
Even if the trial court was momentarily confused as to whether the stipulation was 
still in place, that was neither here nor there because the trial court in any event set April 
30, 2006 as the date for the entry of a certificate of readiness, which was only 24 days 
subsequent to the hearing date. It is apparent then that any momentary confusion as to the 
operation of the stipulation for discovery did not result in the extension of the time for 
discovery nor did it result in the trial court extending the time for the next step in the 
action. Instead, the trial court required the entry of a certificate of readiness by the end of 
^.733: page 5/line 7. 
2R.732: page 7, line 18. At the August 10, 2006 hearing Porter's counsel erroneously 
stated u[I]n your hearing with Mr. Ady just a few months ago you said your understanding was 
that my stipulation ran through April 30, 2006." 
3R.733: page 6/line 3. 
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April 2006, which was only a few weeks after the April 4, 2006 hearing. 
The record of the April 4, 2006 hearing unequivocally shows that the trial court 
was aware of the amount of time that had transpired between November 30, 2004 and 
April 30, 2006. In fact, the court overestimated that time. The court also specifically 
identified April 30, 2005 as the date the stipulated extension of discovery expired. 
Accordingly, the court's order of April 4, 2006 requiring the entry of a certificate of 
readiness by the end of the month was not (as erroneously claimed by Porter at the August 
10, 2006 reconvened hearing)4, entered by mistake. In making that order the trial court 
specifically took into account the lapse of time from November 30, 2004 to April 4, 2006 
and clearly identified April 30, 2005 as the date when discovery terminated. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LAW IN REVERSING ITS APRIL 4, 2006 
RULING AT THE RECONVENED AUGUST 10, 2006 OSC HEARING. 
When on August 10, 2006 the trial court reconvened the April 4, 2006 OSC 
hearing,5 Porter's objection to the filing of a certificate of readiness was argued. Porter 
erroneously alleged that the certificate of readiness misstated the facts and so had been 
improperly filed.6 Analysis of each of the matters certified by PDC shows they were 
properly certified. 
4At the August 10, 2006 hearing Porter's counsel erroneously stated "[I]n your hearing 
with Mr. Ady just a few months ago you said your understanding was that my stipulation ran 
through April 30, 2006." p. 7, line 18. 
5R.732: p. 20/ line 21 et seq. 
6R.732: page 8/ line 4 et seq. 
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1. All necessary pleadings had been filed. Once Judge Davis had made his order 
of November 26, 2003 a responsive pleading was in order from Porter. Porter cannot 
now complain because he did not file a responsive pleading nor should he be allowed to 
obstruct the entry of a certificate of readiness because of his failure to file a responsive 
pleading. In that case, it was appropriate for plaintiff to certify that all necessary 
pleadings had been filed. There is no rule of law that states that a defendant must file a 
responsive pleading before a case can go to trial on the merits. Absent from Porter's 
caviling that he has never filed an answer is any showing of prejudice to Porter because of 
this defect. Because Porter defaulted in making any showing of prejudice due to his 
failure to file an answer, he could make no objection to the certificate of readiness on this 
basis. 
2. Counsel had completed all discovery. This too was an appropriate certification 
by PDC.'s counsel. The amount of discovery to be conducted in any civil case is in the 
discretion of the parties. If the parties choose to forego discovery that is in their 
discretion. As was admitted by Porter at the August 10, 2006 hearing, PDC had already 
deposed Porter for 14 hours. It was Porter that had decided not to conduct any discovery 
whatsoever. Further, as Porter also admitted at the August 10, 2006 hearing, and in fact 
vigorously asserted, that discovery cutoff of April 30, 2005 had long since passed. 
Accordingly, all discovery had been completed and it was appropriate to certify the case 
ready for trial. 
Again, Porter failed to show any prejudice because of this certification. Porter had 
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known since November 26, 2003 that the court had denied his motion for summary 
judgment on his claim that the agreement on settlement terms had been fully satisfied by 
him. As of that date he was on notice that if he wished conduct discovery on that issue 
(or on the merits of the case), he must proceed. But in the almost two and one half years 
until April 4, 2006 Porter chose to conduct no discovery. A party's own refusal to act 
cannot be the cause of prejudice to that party. Porter's objection to the certificate of 
readiness on this basis was unfounded. 
3. Settlement discussions have been pursued by counsel but no settlement has 
been effected. Under Utah law settlement agreements are executory.7 And in this case 
the November 26, 2003 order of Judge Davis had specifically found that material issues 
of fact remained on the issue of whether the case had been settled and that a lengthy 
evidentiary hearing would have to be held to resolve that issue. By force of definition, if 
both parties have moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether settlement had 
been effected and the court had ruled that because material issues of fact remained it 
could not grant either party's motion, a trial is necessary to resolve that issue. Until that 
trial resolves those disputed issues no settlement has been effected. This was an 
appropriate certification. Further, Judge Pullan in his April 4, 2006 order did not limit the 
scope of the certificate of readiness to a trial on the issue of settlement but refer generally 
to a certificate of readiness, thus indicating that he wanted the case set down for trial on 
7See Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1082 (Utah 1985). 
Only upon completion of the substituted performance agreed to by the parties to the agreement 
will the settlement agreement extinguish the underlying claim. See Bradshaw v. Burningham, 
671 P.2d 196,198 (Utah 1983). 
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all issues that remain to be determined. 
Because of Porter's repeated, erroneous assertions on August 10, 2006 that at the 
April 4, 2006 hearing the court had misapprehended the length of the delay in the case, 
the trial court mistakenly reversed its order directing that a certificate of readiness be 
entered because Porter failed to appear at the April 4, 2006 OSC hearing. This was done 
despite PDC's counsel's advice that his recall was that the court had been aware of the 
length of the delay.8 This reversal by the trial court was improper because it was based on 
Porter's erroneous allegations on what had occurred at that April 4, 2006 hearing. It was 
also improper for a number of other reasons. 
First, Porter with his objection filed a belated motion to dismiss. Note that the trial 
court on March 14, 2006 had issued its OSC. Yet Porter filed nothing in advance of that 
motion. In particular, he did not file a motion to dismiss, although all the grounds 
asserted (erroneous though they may be) that were asserted in his May 8, 2006 motion to 
dismiss (also styled as an objection) could have been brought by a motion to dismiss filed 
prior to April 4, 2006. But it was only after he was confronted with a certificate of 
readiness for trial that Porter filed his motion to dismiss. 
More importantly, Porter's motion to dismiss was filed after PDC had filed the 
certificate of readiness. Porter could have immediately filed his objection/ motion to 
dismiss the court's April 4, 2006 order directing the entry of a certificate of readiness (or 
a scheduling order), but waited until after PDC had taken the next step in prosecuting its 
8R.732: page 10/ line 2. 
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case and had filed a certificate of readiness. By then PDC had performed the very act 
required by the trial court to timely move the case toward trial (i.e. file a certificate of 
readiness) and this made the issue of failure to prosecute moot. A moot claim has lost its 
ability to provide judicial relief to the litigants.9 By taking the next step to prosecute the 
case (a step which was specifically directed by the trial court), PDC moved the case 
forward which meant that there was no longer a failure to prosecute by PDC and that 
issue had been rendered moot. 
This meant that when the OSC hearing was reconvened on August 10, 2006 there 
was no longer a failure to prosecute by PDC and that there was no justiciable controversy 
regarding Porter's untimely motion to dismiss.10 Because there was no longer a 
justiciable controversy on the issue of failure to prosecute, all that was left for 
consideration by the trial court was Porter's objection to the entry of the certificate of 
readiness. The issue of mootness may be raised sua sponte by a trial court.11 In that 
regard, it seems the question of mootness falls into the same category as a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.12 Both of these procedural defects militate against a court's further 
considering a matter, because to do so would result in the rendering of an advisory 
9Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,1116, 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 
2002). 
10Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44,1132. 
nId. at 1136. 
nSee Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. DisU 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986) where the court 
stated: "At the outset, we note that acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction and that a lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the 
court." 
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opinion.13 Accordingly, when during the August 10, 2006 hearing the trial court 
considered the question of P D C s failure to prosecute the action before it, it did so 
improperly because that issue had already been rendered moot.14 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PDC'S 
CLAIMS 
Hartford Leasing Corporation v. State15 provides the rule to be applied in this case 
in determining whether the Plaintiffs case was subject to dismissal for failure to 
prosecute. There this Court reviewed and then applied the five factors controlling the 
exercise of a trial court's discretion in determining whether it should dismiss an action. 
The five factors identified were: (1) "the conduct of both parties"; (2) the opportunity 
available to each party to move the case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in 
moving the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party 
by reason of the delay; and (5) "most important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal."16 
In applying these factors to this case it must be remembered that the only delay at 
issue before the trial court on August 10, 2006 was the eleven months of delay accruing 
since the expiration of the April 30, 2005 discovery cut-off. The previous delay in 
13Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2005 UT 21,116. 
14R.732: p. 12/ linelO - 25; p. 13/ line 9; line 11 -18. 
15888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
16Id. at 697. 
16 
prosecution of the case, which had accrued up until the trial court's order of November 
30, 2004 was not considered by the trial court at the Order to Show Cause hearing on 
April 4, 2006. The only delay considered by the trial court at that April 4, 2006 hearing 
were the eighteen months (actually sixteen months) that the trial court stated had accrued 
from November 30, 2004 until April 4, 2006.17 As to that sixteen months, five of those 
months that had accrued had been designated for discovery and only eleven of those 
months were months that had not been scheduled by the trial court. It was this eleven 
months of delay in prosecuting the case that formed the basis upon which the Defendant 
objected to the filing of a certificate of readiness.18 
Proper consideration of that delay requires that the procedural posture of this case 
be understood. The April 15, 2001 agreement signed by the parties specified the terms 
with which Porter must comply before Plaintiffs claims against Porter would be 
dismissed. This included the copying of Porter's hard drive and his making full 
17R.733: page 5/ line 7 et seq. 
18SeeDef.Mem.Obj.: 
p. 2 "when, in fact, that stipulation ended over a year ago on April 30, 2005."; 
p. 3 "Plaintiff did nothing over the next year to challenge the settlement agreement and 
the court issued an Order to Show Cause . . ."; 
p. 4 "during this 60 day period which ended on April 30, 2005 . . ."; 
p. 4 "when in fact the stipulation only ran through April 30, 2005."; 
p. 4 ". . . stipulated time period for Plaintiff to challenge the settlement had passed a year 
before."; 
p. 5 "Plaintiff did nothing on the case for another year until an order to show cause was 
issued by the court."; 
p. 6 "A year has passed since the last stipulated deadline for Plaintiff to challenge the 
settlement..." 
Unfortunately, this memorandum does not appear to be included in the appellate record. 
The motion which this memorandum supports is at R.682. 
17 
disclosure to the Plaintiff under oath in a deposition of all facts regarding his 
appropriation of P D C s client, its proprietary information and the persons involved with 
him in that misappropriation. On June 14 and 29 of 2001 Porter was deposed on those 
matters. Almost immediately the parties were in disagreement about Porter's conduct 
during the deposition. Plaintiff believes it is obvious from the deposition transcripts that 
Porter was being non-cooperative and obstructive. He is clearly a hostile witness. 
For example, under the terms of the agreement on settlement terms Porter is not 
released from liability until a permanent injunction is obtained prohibiting him from 
making any further use of P D C s data or soliciting further work from any of P D C s 
clients. However, performance of this provisions was rendered moot by Porter's own 
malfeasance.19 Moreover, under the terms of the agreement on settlement terms Porter 
was to forthwith irrevocably assign over to PDC all amounts invoiced to date to 
Pharmanex (see h in the settlement agreement). Yet in his deposition Porter at first 
19R.734: 
page 177/line 22 MR. ADY: Porter, have you accessed the Celllnteractive.com Website 
since April 15th of this year? 
page 177/line 15 Porter: / believe I accessed it when you provided me the password to do 
so, yes. 
page 178/line 15 MR. ADY: // 's the case where you can add content but can Y remove it? 
page 178/line 17 Porter: Without removing the whole thing. Unfortunately, in the current 
job search, I need some representation in my portfolio. 
Here is Porter's admission that he has refused to take down his Website. There was no 
attempt by him to take it down, and apparently no consideration given to taking down the 
Website, removing the PDC content and then re-erecting the site for the limited purpose of 
exhibiting Porter's portfolio. In any event, Porter's claim that with the key provided he could 
add but not remove material from his Website was later admitted to be without merit. 
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claimed his work for Pharmanex was performed for free,20 but Porter also equivocates 
about why he was not paid by Pharmanex.21 He stammers that payment was not 
forthcoming because there was a conflict between PDC and Pharmanex and then claims 
that he had no contract for work with Pharmanex. He admits he spoke with the COO of 
Pharmanex, about being paid $6,000.00 per month for his work,22 then denies any such 
conversation.23 When confronted with emails corroborating the conversation with the 
COO, Porter becomes frustrated.24 Porter was also confronted with additional emails 
corroborating the payment arrangements.25 
Despite Porter's contractual commitment to come clean and assist PDC in 
prosecuting third parties, he denies that his romantic interest (the account manager with 
20R.735: page 43/ line 2; page 45/ line 13; page 106/ line 24; page 107/ line 1 (not for 
hire); page 108/ line 15 (a mock invoice). 
21R.734: page 97/ line 13. 
22R.735: page 143/ line 13. 
23R.734: page 93/ line 17. 
24R.734: page 202/ line 13 , finds Porter becoming frustrated when referred to an E-mail 
where he advises a friend, "I could go back to Pharmanex for $6,000 a month." See also page 
203/ line 10 where Porter voices frustration. 
25R.734: page 205 line 15 he is referred to Exhibit 15 and his advice to a friend that he has 
yet to bill Pharmanex for a $10K month. On February 23, 2002 Porter advises his mother (see 
Exhibit 16) that he has billables and just, "[has] to wait a week to get paid." At page 208/ line 
16 he admits that he was to be paid for this work. Porter in the same E-mail refers to at 
$12,000.00 coming to him for his last seven projects and that he is just waiting for the check. 
Yet when asked about this in his deposition at page 209/ line 11 Porter claims he had not yet 
billed Pharmanex for this work. But then at page 211/ line 18 and page 212 /line 11 reference is 
made to exhibits in which Porter refers to loopholes he hopes to use to get around PDC. 
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Pharmanex) was Irying to destroy P D C s relationship with Pharmanex.26 When again 
referred to Exhibit 16 and his statement in that email that, "I hope that PDC is forever 
blacklisted from working with Nuskin. As long as (blank) is there, she'll see to that'\ he 
asserts that Ms. (blank) was ^justified in that cause since I was completing most of the 
work for her."27 These are just a few of the examples of Porter's contumacious refusal to 
perform or execute the terms of his settlement agreement with PDC. In response, Porter 
claims, in substance, that he has been fully cooperative. 
On April 9, 2003 Porter moved to have the agreement on settlement terms deemed 
completed by Porter. On May 10, 2003 PDC filed a cross-motion to have the agreement 
settlement terms declared void because of Porter's refusal to perform his obligations 
under it. On November 26, 2003 Judge Lynn Davis, who prior to Judge Pullan had 
conduct of the case, denied both motions by ruling: 
"Because this Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist, neither 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Counsel for plaintiff is 
instructed to prepare an order denying its motion. Counsel for defendant is 
instructed to prepare an order denying his motion consistent with this 
opinion. It is this Court's opinion that a lengthy evidentiary hearing is 
probably implicated, that experts would need to be employed, and that each 
party might need to seek new legal counsel. In light of this opinion, the 
Court invites the parties to seriously reconsider the proposed resolution of 
the case." R. 0623. 
Porter in his May 8, 2006 objection to the filing of a certificate of readiness falsely 
claims that the trial court denied only P D C s motion to set aside the agreement on 
TR.734: page 150/line 23. 
at page 207, line 3 
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settlement terms. Obviously, under the terms of the November 26, 2003 order both 
parties were equally charged with prosecuting their respective claims regarding the April 
15, 2001 agreement on settlement terms. It is in this context that the five factors identified 
in Hartford Leasing must be applied. 
Neither party moved the case forward in the sixteen months from November 30, 
2004 to April 4, 2006. But PDC had already prior to that time moved the case toward a 
conclusion. PDC has already deposed Porter for two days and has those transcripts. It has 
already copied his hard drive and has all the documents contained on his hard drive. It 
has already filed a number of affidavits in this case specifying the testimony to be 
proffered by the witnesses for PDC in this case. Porter in his deposition has made it clear 
that he is stonewalling and will not be forthcoming with further information. This 
apparently was done to protect the account manager at PDCs former client, with whom 
Porter was romantically involved. As a result of PDC s discovery it has solid evidence 
that Porter not only misappropriated PDC's client and its proprietary information, but 
then entered into an agreement on settlement terms which would have allowed Porter to 
escape all liability to PDC if Porter just made full disclosure. This deposition transcripts 
clearly show that he refused to do so. 
The above facts show that PDC has taken a number of steps to move this case 
forward and in fact has practically moved discovery forward as far as is practicable when 
Porter's stonewalling is taken into consideration, and with its discovery efforts has 
brought the issue of Porter's liability on the merits to a conclusive determination and with 
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those discovery efforts has also brought Porter's liability for breach of his obligations 
under the agreement on settlement terms into clear focus. Thus, it is evident that under 
the first three factors stated in Hartford Leasing PDC has engaged in substantial conduct 
to move the case forward, but has had no greater opportunity than Porter to move the case 
forward and yet PDC has obtained substantial results in moving the case forward. 
When applied to Porter, the picture is much more bleak. Although Porter has had 
an equal opportunity to move the case forward, he has done nothing. Instead, Porter 
although immediately aware of the outcome of the April 4, 2006 Order to Show Cause 
hearing28 did nothing until PDC filed a certificate of readiness for trial, and then in 
response to that certificate of readiness for trial erroneously objected to it by, in 
substance, complaining that Porter had failed to file an answer, had failed to seek the 
entry of a scheduling order and had failed to conduct any discovery on PDC's claims. In 
his objection Porter laid all of this at the feet of PDC by mis-characterizing to the trial 
court that it was PDC's sole obligation to inquire into the enforceability of the agreement 
on settlement terms and by mis-characterizing that PDC was solely responsible for the 
delay from April 30, 2005 to April 4, 2006. 
Recited below are some examples of that self-serving mis-characterization: 
"Also, contrary to Plantiff s assertions, because of the settlement, there has been 
28His counsel called prior to the 9:00 a.m. hearing to state he had mistakenly gone to the 
Provo courthouse and was on his way. It a half hour drive from American Fork to Provo, and the 
court recessed the hearing for 45 minutes so that Porter's counsel could attend. He arrived just 
after the hearing had been concluded. 
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no discovery whatsoever on the merits of Plaintiff s claims."29 
Plaintiff . . . moved to set aside the settlement agreement. That motion was 
denied.30 
[T]he court stated that Plaintiffs affidavits raised issues of fact and, therefore, 
gave Plaintiff time-limited opportunity for discovery on whether settlement had been 
fulfilled and a time limited opportunity limited opportunity to file a dispositive motion on 
the issue."31 
In fact, there are a number of other places in his memorandum in support of 
objection to the trial court where Porter repeatedly mis-characterizes this case as one 
where the Plaintiff was solely responsible for the delay that had accrued, and that the case 
had already been settled but that PDC nevertheless had the sole obligation to inquire into 
the enforceability of the agreement on settlement terms. 
The glaring defect in the trial court's dismissing PDC's case against Porter is that 
it accepted these false claims by Porter when it ruled: 
"In reply the defendant contends that it has never been the defendant's 
burden of proof to challenge the settlement agreement, that a written 
agreement settlement agreement was entered into by the parties, it's always 
been the defendant's view view that the settlement agreement was in place, 
and that it would be the party seeking to set the settlement agreement aside 
that would have the burden of proof and the burden of moving the case 
forward. Having considered those arguments I find the, that the defendant's 
arguments have merit. The motion to dismiss is granted." R.732: page 23/ 
29Def.Mem.Obj. p.2. Unfortunately, it appears that the clerk did not paginate as part of 
the record Porter's memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. The motion is at R.682. In 
any event, this statement is false. As the above transcript excerpts show, PDC has done extensive 
discovery on the merits of its claims. 
30Def.Mem.Obj. p.2. What Porter's counsel fails to mention is that the November 26, 
2003 order denies Porter's motion as well. See R.732: page 14/ line 7. 
31Def.Mem.Obj. p.2. Again, Porter's counsel omits the fact that the court imposed this 
obligation on both parties jointly. See R.623. 
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line 19 et seq. 
As the November 26, 2003 order of Judge Davis clearly shows, both parties were 
equally charged with resolving the issue of whether the agreement on settlement terms 
was enforceable and in relying on Porter's mis-characterization of the status of the 
settlement agreement as a basis to dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint, Judge Pullan relied 
on representations that were clearly wrong. Not only did Judge Pullan err, by accepting 
Porter's characterization of the status of the agreement on settlement as being something 
that "was in place" the court's actions could be construed as overruling Judge Davis. But 
one district judge cannot overrule another acting district judge having identical authority 
and stature.32 
As explained above, PDC's entry of a certificate of readiness in response to the 
trial court's April 4, 2006 order rendered the question of failure to prosecute moot. Once 
the question of failure to prosecute had became moot there could be no need to reconsider 
the November 26, 2003 ruling of Judge Davis, even if Judge Pullan could have properly 
done so. But PDC's motion to strike the Objection of Porter shows that Judge Pullan did 
not have discretion to overrule a coordinate judge on an order that had become law of the 
case.33 So on at least two grounds, the law of the case doctrine and mootness, Judge 
Pullan did not have discretion to revisit the November 26, 2003 order of Judge Davis. 
32State v. Morgan. 527 P.2d 225 (Utah 1974). See also Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 
(Utah 1987) where the court held that one district court judge cannot overrule another district 
court judge of equal authority even if prior judge relinquished all authority and jurisdiction in 
matter for reasons of judicial economy. 
33R.695. 
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Further, once it is recognized that both parties had an equal obligation to litigate 
the enforceability of the agreement on settlement terms then the fourth factor in Hartford 
Leasing,34 which is the prejudice imposed upon Porter by reason of the delay, is readily 
resolved. Porter was throughout this time well aware of the terms of the November 26, 
2003 order which required him to conduct discovery on his claim that he had fully 
performed his obligations under the settlement agreement. He knew that he had 
conducted no discovery whatsoever in this case and that the only discovery had been 
conducted by PDC. In that light, the only prejudice that accrued to Porter as a result of 
the delay is prejudice which Porter imposed upon himself. Because he chose to forego 
discovery, Porter cannot be heard to make the ludicrous complaint that because of PDC s 
delay Mr Porter has not conducted discovery. It was because of Porter's delay that Porter 
did not conduct any discovery. 
Moreover, Porter failed to make any showing to the trial court that anything had 
happened in those eleven months to impair his ability to prosecute his claim that he had 
fully performed his obligations under the agreement on settlement terms. There was no 
showing of the disappearance of witnesses, of documents or of any other evidence. 
The final factor to be considered is whether injustice will result from the dismissal. 
As the court in Hartford Leasing stated "'Dismissal with prejudice . . . is a harsh and 
permanent remedy when it precludes a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their 
888 P.2d at 698. 
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merits."v Dismissal of P D C s claims because Porter has failed to conduct any discovery 
on his claim that he had fully performed his obligations under the agreement on 
settlement terms, is manifestly unjust because it punishes the Appellant/ PDC for Porter's 
default. For almost two and one half years prior to the April 4, 2006 show cause hearing, 
Porter knew of the November 26, 2003 order that specifically denied his motion to 
enforce the agreement on settlement terms, yet he did nothing. When at the April 4, 2006 
OSC hearing the trial court properly directed that a certificate of readiness be entered or a 
scheduling order be entered, he did not seek the entry of a scheduling order entered, but 
instead waited to see if a Certificate of Readiness was filed. Then he objected to the 
filing of that Certificate of Readiness because, among other defaults by Porter, no 
scheduling order had been entered. 
A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for the 
decision."36 Under Hartford Leasing and a continuing line of cases back to Westinghouse 
Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.37 the five factors applied in 
Hartford Leasing are the criteria to be applied in determining whether there was a 
reasonable basis for dismissing an action with prejudice. Those factors largely consist of 
a comparison of the conduct of the respective parties to the action. The analysis above 
shows that when each of those five criteria are applied to the procedural facts of this case, 
35Hartford at 700, quoting Bonneville Tower Condominium Mgt. Comm. v. Thompson 
Michie Assocs.. toe, 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). 
36Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
37544 P.2d 876 (Utahl975). 
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Porter's case for dismissal is no more than a complaint that he has been dilatory. 
Although both parties conducted extensive motion practice on the issue of whether 
the agreement on settlement terms was enforceable, only PDC has conducted discovery 
which bears on that issue. And only PDC has conducted discovery which bears on the 
issue of the merits of this case. Porter has had equal opportunity and was given notice by 
the November 26, 2203 order, just as PDC was, that the enforceability of the settlement 
agreement was an issue to be resolved. It would be a harsh and entirely unjust outcome to 
dismiss PDC's claims because Porter does not want to go to trial on a record he for at 
least two and one half years knew would be the record unless he conducted further 
discovery. The trial court's reliance on Porter's mis-characterization as to the meaning 
and effect of the November 26, 2003 order and basis of the trial court's April 4, 2006 
order was clearly without foundation in fact. Accordingly, the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing PDC's claims and that order of dismissal should be reversed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
In making its April 4, 2006 order the trial court properly took into account the 
length of delay in prosecuting this case. A certificate of readiness was entered on the 
strength of that order. This rendered the issue failure to prosecute moot. There was no 
basis for reconvening the OSC hearing on August 10, 2006 and because there was no 
justiciable controversy before the trial court on that date, Porter's motion to dismiss was 
also moot. The April 15, 2001 agreement on settlement terms provide for the payment of 
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reasonable attorney fees and costs by the party breaching that agreement. PDC requests a 
ruling by this Court that the trial court erred in dismissing the Appellant's case with 
prejudice or, alternatively, abused its discretion. PDC further requests a ruling from this 
Court that it is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and cost for this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of October, 2007. 
RONXLD ADY/ 
Attorney for PDC Consulting, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM: 
A. Transcript of April 4, 2006 hearing 
B. Transcript of August 10, 2006 ruling dismissing the case with prejudice. 
C. Order dismissing the case with prejudice. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Brief of The 
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2 (April 4, 2006) 
3 THE JUDGE: PDC Consulting, Inc. versus Jared 
4 Porter. 
5 MR. ADY: Ronald Ady here for PDC Consulting, 
6 Your Honor. 
7 THE JUDGE: Good morning. Is a, who contacted 
8 the clerk's office? And you went to Provo this morning? 
9 MR. ADY: No, I didn't. 
10 THE JUDGE: Oh. 
11 THE CLERK: Oh, I'm sorry. It was Matthew Raty. 
12 THE JUDGE: Matthew Raty. Okay. And is he 
13 counsel for the defendant I guess? Have you had any 
14 conversation with Mr. — 
15 MR. ADY: No. 
16 THE JUDGE: — Raty? He contacted the court 
17 this morning and said he had inadvertently gone to Provo 
18 rather than to here so he is enroute. What time did he 
19 call, do you know? 
20 THE CLERK: (Short inaudible, no mic),. 
21 THE JUDGE: He should be here any minute. 
22 THE CLERK: He should be here soon. 
23 THE JUDGE: I'll give him, let's give him until 





























Court will be in recess for a few moments. 
(Recess). 
THE JUDGE: Do we have any sign of Mr. Raty this 
morning? 
MR. ADY: No. 
THE JUDGE: I'll call the matter of PDC 
Consulting, Inc. versus Jared Porter. The record should 
reflect that counsel for Mr. Porter contacted the clerk a 
little after 9:00 this morning indicating that he had gone to 
the wrong courthouse, he had gone to Provo. It's now five 
to 10:00. There was ample time to appear and a, we've not 
seen him. 
Mr. Ady, what is the status of this case? 
MR. ADY: The status, Your Honor, last time we 
were here we were going to do some discovery and that never, 
I don't know what happened. I haven't had a chance to look 
in the file frankly. I had it on my calendar and came this 
morning. I'm currently involved in briefing two appeals at 
the same time and I, each of them my draft some far is 50 
pages each which is the maximum. So frankly, I haven't 
looked at the file. But as I recall it there were still 
discovery issues. 
And particularly from our side, the plaintiff's 
side we had brought a motion to set aside the settlement. 




























settlement agreement, that was executory and he hadn't 
complied with substantial terms. I know there had been 
argument on that and I know we had talked about discovery the 
last time around. And I don't think any further discovery 
has occurred. 
THE JUDGE: I'm looking at a, an order on 
November 30th, 2004 ruling, so 18 months ago Indicates, 
A hearing was held on order to show 
cause. Plaintiff was represented by 
Mr. Ady and defendants by Mr. Raty..., or 
Raty ... having discussed the matter with 
counsel... It says ... it's hereby 
ordered the parties have 90 days from 
entry of this order to conduct discovery 
in regard to whether the parties have 
settled the case. 
Two, following the parties' 90 day 
discovery period in regard to whether the 
parties have settled the case the parties 
shall time any and all dispositive 
motions in regard to their settlement 
agreement. 
And that, this must have been my case back then and 
it's been reassigned to me again. That's under my signature 





























MR. ADY: No. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And then there's an extension, 
there's an agreement for an extension of time to April 30th 
in the file, 2005. So looks like you've agreed to, to that 
you have time a, until April 30th to complete discovery. 
That a, stipulated extension remains in place. And a, I'll 
order that a notice of readiness for trial be filed after 
that. Sounds like you have some more time. 
Then if I don't receive a certificate of readiness 
for trial or some other scheduling order by April 30th the 
case will be dismissed. 
MR. ADY: Very well, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you, Mr. Ady. 
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(August 10, 2006) 
THE JUDGE: The court will call the matter of PDC 
Consulting, Inc. versus Porter. Counsel, will you state 
your appearances please. 
MR. ADY: Ronald Ady here for the plaintiff PDC. 
MR. RATY: Matthew Raty for the defendants, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. We're here on the 
defendant's motion to dismiss and objection to the 
certificate of readiness for trial. I've read the 
pleadings in support of the motion. I'll hear from you 
first, sir. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. RATY 
MR. RATY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
As you noted we are here on the defendant's motion 
for dismiss and a, objection to the certificate of readiness 
for trial. And the first thing I need to note for the court 
is that the motion is unopposed. The motion was filed three 
months ago and submitted to this court for decision more than 
two months ago. 
Now, this morning when I got to my office I found a 
fax from the plaintiff's attorney and that brief motion was 
titled something like a motion to strike defendant's motion 




























two months and under the rules should not be considered by 
the court. 
In addition to those procedural rules why you 
should dismiss the case, let me take you through some 
important facts which also give you substantial reason under 
the Jaw and under your discretion to dismiss the case. 
The plaintiff's complaint, Your Honor, was filed on 
April 6, 2001, more than five years ago. And this case 
actually settled within 10 days of the complaint being 
filed. Mr. Ady who sits here at plaintiff's counsel table 
met with an attorney for the defendants and they sat down and 
hammered out a settlement agreement and they both signed it. 
And I've attached that to my pleadings which I've given to 
you. 
Subsequent to that... And that was everyone's, of 
course, understanding that the case that settled. 
Subsequent to that as part of the settlement agreement a, 
Mr. Ady deposed the defendant Jared Porter for approximately 
14 hours, so he could have obtained more names or try to look 
for some other entities to, to go after. These, these 
efforts by the plaintiff apparently proved fruitless. So 
the plaintiff at that point refused to a, enter a dismissal 
of the case as was contemplated and agreed in the settlement 
agreement. 




























aside the settlement. That motion was filed two years after 
the complaint had been filed, two years after the case had 
settled, and that was filed on May 9, 2003. Judge Davis, 
your predecessor, heard that motion to set aside the 
settlement agreement filed by the a, the plaintiff. And I 
think I've attached that also— 
THE JUDGE: You have. 
MR. RATY: — for your review. But one thing 
said he said was, or his decision was a lengthy evidentiary 
hearing is probably implicated, that experts would need to be 
employed, and that each party may need to seek new legal 
counsel. Now, he said that because Mr. Ady and the 
defendant's previous attorney were both witnesses to the 
settlement agreement and, and had filed affidavits disputing 
a, whether the settlement had in effect been fulfilled. So 
a, that's what he said at that time. 
The plaintiff did nothing over the next year, 
entire year subsequent to Judge Davis's ruling to challenge 
the settlement. And so on November 30th, 2004 the court 
scheduled an order to show cause. Oh, and by the way, 
Judge Davis as you probably noted, also a, put in his opinion 
that the plaintiff had done nothing for two years on the case 
and offered no explanation for his delay. , 
So then, you know, a year and a half or so passed 




























show cause over in Provo. And a, at that point you noted 
the hi_story and a, that the settlement dispute had never 
been resolved. You gave the plaintiff 90 days to do 
discovery on the settlement issues and file any and all 
dispositive motions in regard to the settlement agreement. 
Now the plaintiff didn't do anything during that 90 
day period, no discovery on the settlement issues, and didn't 
file any motion. 
At the end of that 90 day period I got a call from 
Mr. Ady asking me to give him a 60 day extension for him to 
do that discovery on the settlement issues and to file any 
motion he may want to file on the settlement. But again 
during that 60 day period the plaintiff did absolutely 
nothing. 
And then after that, Your Honor, a whole other 
year passed with the plaintiff doing nothing on the case. 
And so you scheduled another order to show cause for 
April 4th, 2006 of this year. 
And a, I need to apologize to you because I went 
down to the Provo court wrongly assuming you were still 
down there for that hearing. And a, you know, I was going to 
explain all of this to you at that time and explain that, you 
know, there's been five years this case hasn't been 
prosecuted by the plaintiff, and he never challenged the 




























unfortunately I went to the wrong court. I called your 
clerk or one of your clerks, told them I would get over here 
as quickly as I could and I did that. As I walked in the 
door you had just concluded a, a hearing with Mr. Ady for the 
plaintiff and you were walking into your chambers. So a, I 
missed that hearing and I apologize for that. 
I did get a tape of the hearing to see what had 
been said. And the most significant thing I thought in 
that hearing that you had with Mr. Ady was your 
misimpression of a stipulation between the parties. And I 
know I've given you a lot of dates and a lot of history so I 
don't want to be confusing about this. 
But taking you back to your first order to show 
cause in November of 2004 you gave the plaintiff 90 days to 
do that discovery on settlement and file dispositive 
motion. At the end of that you'll remember I told you I 
agreed to a 60 day extension for the plaintiff and that 
extension was until April 30, 2005. But with your, in your 
hearing with Mr. Ady just a few months ago you said your 
understanding was that my stipulation ran through April 30, 
2006. 
THE JUDGE: And I think you're right about that. 
MR. RATY: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: I think that that was a mistake. 




























have been avoided. And I apologize again if I just would 
have come to the right court. 
THE JUDGE: That happens. 
MR. RATY: But then to my great surprise the, the 
plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness for trial and, and 
stated to the court that all the required pleadings had been 
filed in this case, discovery had been completed, and that 
there had been no settlement. All those statements were 
incorrect, Your Honor. 
Because this case settled and that was never 
overturned there's never been an answer filed, Judge Davis 
made it clear that until we resolved this settlement issue a, 
this, any litigation was not going to go forward on this 
case. That was a hurdle or a bar that if he wanted to 
challenge he could have done that and a, if he prevailed then 
we could have got into litigation on the case. But there's 
never been an answer filed. There's been no attorney 
planning meeting, there's been no initial disclosures, the 
plaintiff has not filed any initial disclosures, there's 
never been a scheduling order that would allow me to a, 
begin discovery on the case. 
And there, you know, I know this case settled and 
you're not going to just dismiss it today because of the, 
the failure to prosecute the case, and you ultimately wind up 




























litigation to do on this case 
But a, I would ask you to dismiss it because 
number one, the plaintiff had the burden of prosecution on 
this matter. He's had numerous opportunities to challenge 
the settlement which took place over five years ago, he's, 
he's never done that. And a, more than one year has passed 
since I gave him that last stipulation to extent the time to 
challenge the settlement. And a, so that in and of itself 
is reasons to dismiss the case. 
You're also well within the law and discretion to 
dismiss it because my motion to dismiss was unopposed by, 
by the plaintiff. We're here today on that. I filed it 
three months ago. I mailed it to him, I faxed it to him, I 
sent him a letter. He had every opportunity to challenge 
that motion to dismiss but he didn't do it. So there's a 
second independent reason you're well within the law and 
equity here to dismiss this case. 
And, therefore, I would ask you to dismiss it. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you very much, counsel. 
Mr. Ady? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. ADY 
MR. ADY: Well, I suppose the first thing I would 
like to address, Your Honor, is the last hearing. I don't 
think the court's comment about April 30th, 2006, I haven't 
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listened to the tape like Mr. Raty, but I don't believe that 
that was a, I think that was a misstatement. I don't think 
it was something that, that the court, as I recall, it 
understood was correct. I think the court meant to say 
April 30th, 2005 when it said that as I recall it. Again I 
haven't listened to the tape like Mr. Raty has but that's, 
that was my impression. 
Now, I understand Mr. Raty didn't appear at the 
last hearing for a reason that has befallen all of us. And 
I've gone to the wrong court on the wrong date before, so I 
certainly don't fault Mr. Raty for that. I've shown up in 
federal court and looked a little bit red faced because I was 
there on the wrong day. 
But the proper procedure would have been for him I 
think to come back and a, renotice the hearing. He 
listened to the tape. The court in its minute entry said, 
was clear about what was to be done, file a certificate of 
readiness or a scheduling order. It was open to Mr. Raty to 
do the very thing that he complains of here and that is file 
a scheduling order. He didn't do that. He didn't take 
that opportunity given by the court. He was aware of it as 
he's admitted. And so I think a, instead he chose to dredge 
up something that is already the law of this case and he's 
asking the court to go back and overrule Judge Davis. And 




























certificate of readiness for trial. 
Mascaro (phonetic) versus Davis, which is the case 
pointing out that a coordinate judge simply doesn't have 
jurisdiction to overrule a judge on the same matter in the 
same case. The issue he brings before the court on this 
matter has already been decided. 
In addition there is a statute that says, and I put 
that in the memorandum as well, that bars second 
applications. He's had his kick at the can on this matter. 
And so a, he's asking the court basically to go back and 
overrule Judge Davis, which is improper. 
The, the problem... And he's, he's alleging that 
this issue of settlement hasn't been litigated. Well, if 
one looks at the procedural history recited in Judge Davis's 
order we've got April 9, 2003 defendant's motion to enforce, 
memorandum in support of motion to enforce. May 10th, 
plaintiff's motion to set aside settlement, plaintiff's 
memorandum in support. June 20th defendant' reply 
memorandum in support of motion to enforce. Affidavit of 
I 
Jared Porter, affidavits by John Pate (phonetic), 
supplemental affidavit by Jared Porter. Notice to submit. 
Motion to extent time. My motion to strike, which is quite 
lengthy if one looks at the file, dealing with all of these 




And so a, if the court is going to actually look 
at a, Mr. Raty's motion to dismiss I would submit that all 
those materials are properly before the court. And his 
argument that I simply haven't responded to that is in 
error. They're there. They're on the record. And I 
think it's clear that the affidavit evidence that they 
present is not sufficient on the basis of the motions and the 
memoranda I filed on September 25th. I would invite the 
court to consider those. 
Secondly, Mr. Raty says that a, my motion to 
strike is untimely and that the court can't consider it. 
I beg to differ. I think that it's clear a, cases like a, 
Olsen versus Salt Lake County School District are, are very 
clear that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time. 
And this goes to the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction. I say that advisedly recognizing that I'm not 
arguing that the court doesn't have subject matter 
jurisdiction to deal with this case. But there's a federal 
court decision, and I wish I could recall it, if the court 
wishes me to supplement I will. It points out that what I'm 
really arguing is not that the court lacks general subject 
matter jurisdiction but there's a specific statutory bar and 
a specific precedent by the supreme court of this state that 




























here that the court is jurisdictionally barred and that that 
can be raised at any time. And that a, the statute is quite 
explicit. 
And as I say, for Mr. Raty to say well we haven't, 
we've never really litigated this issue of this settlement 
agreement I think is simply wrong. You go back and look at 
the documents and the motions filed, and my memoranda that 
was filed, and they are not unsubstantial. We litigated this 
vigorously and at length, Judge Davis decided it. We were 
here on in April of this year, a certificate of readiness was 
entered pursuant to that. And as I say, Mr. Raty had the 
opportunity to either file a scheduling order. And at this 
point we've got the deposition of Mr. Porter and we're saying 
we're ready to go to trial on this case, we'll go, let's tee 
it up and get it done with. 
Mr|. Raty is arguing and saying well, 10 days after 
a, this complaint was filed this case was settled, and 
plaintiff has done nothing over these many years. Well, 
it's defendant here that has been trying to, that's been 
arguing that this should have been enforced, this settlement 
agreement. We said it should not have been. 
And defendant has had full opportunity throughout 
all of this time to do all of the, the discovery. It hasn't 
done any of that. 




























respect that if defendant points a finger at plaintiff in 
saying you've delayed, there's three fingers on that hand 
pointing right back at defendant because it's delayed as 
well. And there's simply no basis for it to, to attack 
plaintiff and say well this delay by plaintiff, you should 
dismiss it because of delay by plaintiff. 
Well, the defendant has been guilty of gross delay 
here, especially when since 2003 we've had Judge Davis's 
decision, defendant knew that it was an issue, and now it's 
jumping back and saying wait, I've got to do loads of 
discovery. And as I say, it had the benefit of this 
court's direction at the last hearing in April, file a 
certificate of readiness or file a scheduling order by 
April 30th, do one of those two things. Mr. Raty wasn't 
here at the hearing but he came in just as it closed. And he 
said he listened to the tape. He didn't move to file a 
scheduling order, he didn't, he didn't present one to me or 
the court. We filed our certificate of readiness. 
And we believe, and we've moved before the court 
now we'd like to have a pretrial order, I've attached a 
proposed form to our motion, and we would like to get this 
matter set down for trial. 






























FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. RATY 
MR. RATY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
I did, as Mr. Ady has repeatedly stated, listened 
to the tape of your hearing with him. And a, and what you 
did was told Mr. Ady who, of course, as the plaintiff has the 
burden of prosecuting the case, you told him to file a 
scheduling or, file a scheduling order or a certificate of 
readiness for trial or you would dismiss the case. And 
again, that was under the misimpression you had that the 
stipulation was still in effect and had not ended a full year 
previous. 
I talked to Mr. Ady after your hearing with him 
and asked him what he was going to do. Because as you walked 
into chambers and he walked out of the court I said well, 
I 
what happened? And he, he said the judge told be I've got to 
file a scheduling order or certificate of readiness for trial 
or he's going to dismiss the case. And I said, well what 
are you going to do? And he said I don't know. And by 
that I understood him to mean that he was just going to drop 
the case because he hadn't done anything on it for years, or 
he would get a scheduling order and ask the court for more 
time to address these settlement issues. That was his 
burden, not mine. 
I'm the defendant's attorney in this case. And by 


























he's already incurred tens of thousands of dollars in 
litigation expenses in this case. And, you know, I'm under 
instructions to, to not incur more expense if at all 
possible. 
And, you know, it's Horn Book law that he's the 
plaintiff, he has the burden of prosecution. And where he 
does nothing on the case the case should be dismissed. 
It's not, he's trying to, you know, in fact he says, you 
know, look at my fingers they're all pointing back at me. 
It's not my burden, you know. We thought this was a 
frivolous case all along. The case settled over five years 
ago. It's in my mind absurdly been a... The plaintiff has 
not complied with what it agreed to do in this the settlement 
and dismiss the case when we complied, which we did, with the 
settlement terms. 
And so I'm in kind of a catch 22. Do I try and 
generate a lot more fees for my poor client to pay a, and 
push this thing to a dismissal, which I did try to do, by the 
way, before but Mr. Ady filed an affidavit swearing that a, 
things had not been done which we said had been done in the, 
in the settlement. So it is a catch 22. It's very 
expensive for my client and he's without recourses 
(phonetic). We don't have the burden of prosecution, he 
does . 




























complete surprise. Because as you know there's been no a, 
litigation of the merits of his complaint, it's all been on 
the issue of the settlement. So it came as a complete 
surprise to me that he would actually by bold enough to file 
a certificate of readiness for trial when there's been no 
discovery. He's not even filed initial disclosures, no 
attorney planning meeting, no answer. 
So, you know, he's trying to blame me for this but 
it's, it's his case that he filed originally. The case was 
settled, that's always been our position. And if he wanted 
to get rid of that settlement it was his duty to do 
something about it. 
Now he says well, I didn't have to respond to Mr., 
I didn't have to respond to the defendant's motion to 
dismiss because a, all these issues were brought before the 
court three years ago before Judge Davis. But a, what he's 
not telling you there is he's done anything since Judge Davis 
looked at all of those issues and made his ruling and said 
there's disputes of fact here, you're going to have to do 
discovery on these settlement disputes, you probably need to 
hire new attorneys because Mr. Ady is a witness. And a, 
he's done absolutely nothing on these settlement issues 
since Judge Davis made that ruling. And since you gave him 
another chance and I gave him another chance he's done 




























So the things he was reading you from Judge Davis's 
ruling, those were all things that, that came before his 
November 2003 ruling, not things that have come after. He's 
done nothing on the case. 
He did not respond to the motion to dismiss. 
And by the way a, he, he's telling Your Honor that my motion 
to dismiss is trying to rehash the settlement issues which 
Judge Davis looked at. That's not what my motion to 
dismiss was about. The basis of by motion was that the 
plaintiff had not timely challenged a, the settlement 
following Judge Davis's ruling back in November 2003, and 
he's done absolutely nothing on the case otherwise whether, 
with the settlement or otherwise. 
That was the grounds for my motion to dismiss. 
He didn't oppose it and Your Honor should, and I request, 
I think we've suffered long enough with this, and I request 
that you dismiss the case with prejudice at this point. 
Do you have any questions, Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: I don't. 
MR. ADY: I appreciate it. Thank you, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
MR. ADY: I'd like to briefly reply, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I don't think there's anything new 
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FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. ADY 
MR. ADY: He's saying that his motion goes beyond 
Judge Davis's order. And our point simply is that I don't 
believe it does and that our September, and our 
September 25th motion and memorandum is on the file, it's on 
the record, it's there. It's never been disposed of. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. Can you hear me 
today? 
MR. RATY: I can hear you fine. 
THE JUDGE: Is that right? Maybe it's me who is 
losing my hearing. It's possible. 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: This case comes before the court on 
the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute 
and also motion to strike or objection to the certificate 
of readiness for trial filed by the plaintiff in this 
matter. 
Initially I want to deal with the question of this 
court's order to show cause conducted on April 4th, 2006. 
On that date the court held an order to show cause hearing to 
determine why this case should not be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. Mr. Ady appeared on behalf of the 
plaintiffs. Is it Raty? 




























THE JUDGE: Mr. Raty did not appear that date. 
He had mistakenly gone to the Provo courthouse. 
The court called the matter. Because we were at an 
order to show cause status, a, counsel who has no objection 
to the case being dismissed need not appear. The plaintiff 
had appeared. 
And having reviewed the case file in preparation 
for today's hearing I do concur with Mr. Raty that the court 
was under the misimpression that the parties had stipulated 
to a continuance of discovery to April 30th of 2006. Having 
reviewed the file that is clearly a misimpression on my 
part. And I'll go through those facts in a minute. 
Unfortunately, that series of events reguired the 
defendant to file the present motion to address matters that 
were unable, he was unable to present at the order to show 
cause hearing. 
No timely response was filed to that motion. The 
court has received a faxed a, motion to strike the 
defendant's motion today. The reason that I scheduled an 
unopposed motion to dismiss for hearing was because that it, 
it is dispositive of the case, and also to give both parties 
an opportunity to appear and to discuss the issues that 
could have been presented at the order to show cause hearing 
in April of 2006 but were not because of a, counsel's 




























As I said, I have had a chance to review the case 
history. 
The complaint was filed in April of 2001 and a 
settlement, a written settlement agreement was reached 
between the parties on April 15th, 2001. Pursuant to that 
settlement agreement I believe the parties, it's undisputed 
that the defendant submitted to a lengthy deposition. 
Approximately two years passed, well, more than 
two years. And in November of 2003 the plaintiff moved to 
set aside the settlement agreement. Judge Davis heard that 
motion and ultimately issued a ruling dated November 3rd of 
2003. Having considered that ruling it was Judge Davis's 
determination that, 
A lengthy evidentiary hearing is 
probably implicated, that experts would 
need to be employed, and 
that each party might need to seek new 
legal counsel. 
The court further found that, 
Genuine issues of material fact 
existed, and that neither party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 




























This case has been inactive for over 
two years, even though plaintiff claims 
that material breaches of the settlement 
agreement by defendant occurred as early 
as June and July of 2001. Plaintiff has 
offered no explanation for this delay. 
The next hearing occurred almost, a little more 
than one year later on November 30th, 2004. The case had 
been reassigned to this court at that time. The court 
issued and order to show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. At that time the court 
ordered that the parties file any and all dispositive 
motions relating to the viability of the settlement 
agreement within 90 days of November 30th, 2004. 
Counsel by stipulation extended that 90 day period 
for an additional 60 days and that period would have closed 
on April 30th, 2005. 
The next hearing was scheduled one year from the 
expiration of that date on April 4th, of 2006 for order to 
show cause. And as I indicated, I believe that I was under 
the misimpression that the parties had stipulated to an 
extension to April 30th of 2006, and based on that 
misimpression I ordered that the plaintiff file a scheduling 





























The defendant moves to dismiss this action for 
failure to prosecute based on that record. He contends 
that the plaintiff has had ample opportunity in which to 
challenge the settlement agreement, that the court has 
granted extensions to the plaintiff to allow that to happen, 
that the defendant has granted extensions to allow that to 
happen, and that no evidentiary hearing has ever been 
scheduled and no discovery has ever been completed as to, 
well, no evidentiary hearing has ever been held as directed 
by Judge Davis as to whether the settlement agreement was 
breached or not. 
The plaintiff has appeared today and contends 
that the, that the motion reguires a reassessment of Judge 
Davis's November 2004 ruling, and that it would be 
inappropriate for this court to in effect grant a viability 
to the settlement agreement when Judge Davis has previously 
ruled that a, genuine issues of fact would preclude such a 
ruling. 
In reply the defendant contends that it has never 
been the defendant's burden of proof to challenge the 
settlement agreement, that a written settlement agreement was 
entered into by the parties, it's always been the defendant's 
view that the settlement agreement was in place, and that it 
would be the party seeking to set that settlement agreement 




























moving the case forward. 
Having considered those arguments I find the, that 
the defendant's arguments have merit. The motion to dismiss 
is granted. And I will look to you, Mr. Raty, to prepare an 
order consistent with that decision. 
MR[. RATY: Thank you Your Honor. And that is 
with prejudice, is it not? 
THE JUDGE: It is. 
MR. ADY: Your Honor— 
THE JUDGE: It's to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute. 
MR.1 ADY: — for the sake of clarifying the 
record and in the interest of judicial economy, is the court 
saying that the plaintiff is guilty of failure to prosecute 
generally or is it the court's finding that the plaintiff has 
failed to prosecute the issue of whether or not the 
settlement agreement was enforceable? 
1 
THE JUDGE: I've made a detailed record of the 
facts. And the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is 
granted. 
MR. RATY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Court is in recess. 
MR. ADY: Could I put another thing on the record, 
Your Honor, for the sake of the record? 




























intend to readdress my factual statements. 
MR. ADY: Very well. 
THE JUDGE: So make your record, Mr. Ady. 
MR. ADY: For the record, Your Honor, with 
respect, if the court is saying that the plaintiff hasn't 
prosecuted the case generally, there's nothing in here in the 
defendant's memorandum and motion which addresses those 
issues and there's no case authority cited. He simply 
hasn't briefed the argument. And so I would submit it's not 
before the court. 
As to the issue of whether or not plaintiff has 
failed to prosecute the issue of the settlement agreement, 
for the record we would also argue that the motion and 
memorandum fails to put that properly into issue. 
As I understood his motion it was a motion that 
sought basically to say there's, there's an outstanding 
settlement agreement, you've never moved to set that aside or 
challenge that, the issue has been outstanding too long, 
therefore, dismiss this case. That to me is the motion 
that I read. 
And as I pointed out to the court previously, it's 
our position the court has no jurisdiction and that a, once 
again the defendant has simply failed to brief that issue, 
cites no case authority in support of that issue if that in 
fact is the issue that he was arguing. And we would submit 
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that there's simply nothing before the court to rule on or at 
the least there's no adequate argument before the court if 
that is the issue. 
Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you for that 
supplemented record. Court's in recess. Thank you. 
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
PDC CONSULTING, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V. 
JARED PORTER, and JARED PORTER, ] 
dba CELL INTERACTIVE, and JARED ] 
PORTER dba CELLDESIGN; and DOES 1 ) 
through 10, ) 
Defendants. ] 
1 ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
> COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 
1 Case No. 050100017 
1 Judge Derek P. Pullan 
On August 10, 2006, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Objection to Certificate of Readiness for Trial came before the court for hearing. Plaintiff was 
represented by its counsel, Ronald Ady, and Defendants were represented by their attorney, Matthew H 
Raty. Having reviewed the memoranda filed in support and in opposition to Defendants' motion, having 
heard the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice for the reasons stated by the court in the August 10, 2006 hearing, including, but not limited 
to, the following: (J i . 
SEP 6 2006 
4TH D I S T R I C T ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
1. Plaintiff failed to prosecute the case. 
2. Plaintiff failed to timely renew its denied motion to set aside the parties' April 15. 
2001 settlement agreement within the dates and extensions given by court and opposing counsel to 
renew the motion. 
3. Plaintiff failed to timely oppose Defendants' motion to dismiss. 
DATED this _6>_ day of J l^?/ . 2006. 
BY THE COUI tfWK£0 
0 I Closed2006\Porter\P\0-DismissComplaint 
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